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TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION IN MISSOURI*
WILLIAM

F.

FRATCHER**

Probably the most interesting decision of the period under review,
because of its significant contribution to the theory of the pour-over trust,
was that in St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Blue.' The decedent created a
revocable and amendable insurance trust for the benefit of members of his
family. Eighteen years later he created an irrevocable trust for the benefit
of members of his family with specific provision for later additions of
principal. Two years after this the decedent executed a will by which he
devised to the trustees of the irrevocable inter vivos family trust, to be
held under its terms, so much of his residuary estate as should be necessary
to bring the trust estate up to $800,000. Later in the same year the decedent
amended the insurance trust to require payment of the insurance proceeds
to the two trustees of the irrevocable family trust, "as Trustees under the
terms" of that trust. The trustees of the irrevocable family trust, one of
them also suing as trustee of the insurance trust and as executor of the
will, sought a declaratory judgment as to whether the proceeds of the
insurance were intended to become a part of the original irrevocable inter
vivos family trust and so to be considered in computing the $800,000, or
whether the amendment to the insurance trust contemplated a separate
trust with merely the same terms as the irrevocable family trust. A judgment that the amendment created a separate trust was reversed, and it
was held that both the insurance proceeds and the amount payable from
the residuary estate became part of the irrevocable family trust, which was
and remained a single inter vivos trust. The opinion expressly rejects the
argument that the amendment to the insurance trust merely incorporated
by reference the terms of the irrevocable family trust.
In recent years the pour-over trust has become a useful and valued
device in estate planning. Typically the settlor creates an inter vivos trust
for his family and puts into it such assets as he can do without during his
*This article contains a discussion of selected Missouri court decisions reported in Volumes 349-357, Southwestern Reporter, Second Series.
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri; member of the Michigan and
Missouri Bars.
1. 353 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1962).
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lifetime. He may make additions to the trust from time to time before his
death. By his will the settlor bequeaths what is left of his assets to the
trustee of the inter vivos trust, to be held and administered under the terms
of that trust. In many cases the device affords substantial tax advantages
because gift tax rates are less than those of the estate tax. In any case, it
avoids setting out the terms of a long and complicated trust in the will,
with attendant publicity and expense incident to copying in abstracts of
title and public records.
The first serious problem in the pour-over trust field is that of the
validity of the device. This stems from the statutory requirement that
wills be in writing and the fact that the terms of the trust are not set
out in the pour-over will. England and the great majority of American states
recognize the doctrine of incorporation by reference, under which a document not executed with testamentary formalities may be treated as part
of a will if: (1) the will manifests an intention to incorporate the document;
(2) the will contains a sufficient description of the document to permit
its identification with reasonable certainty; (3) the will refers to the document as being already in existence; (4) the document actually was in
existence before the will was executed; and (5) the document can be proved
to be the identical one referred to in the will. 2 These requirements can be
met readily in the case of an irrevocable inter vivos trust created by a
writing signed on a date prior to that of the will. If, however, the inter
vivos trust is amendable by the settlor during his lifetime, amendments to
it made after the date of the will do not meet these requirements. As the
testator ordinarily intends to refer to the terms of the inter vivos trust as
they are at the date of his death, that is, including the amendments made
after the date of the will, courts relying upon the doctrine of incorporation by reference have had great difficulty with this situation. One approach
has been to hold the pour-over bequest void on the grounds that the
testator did not intend to incorporate by reference the trust instrument
as it existed on the date of the will, and could not incorporate it by reference as it existed at the date of his death.3 Another approach has been
to hold the pour-over bequest valid, but on the terms of the trust as they
were at the date of the will, so that the assets added to the trust by the
2. ArKINSON, WILLS § 80 (2d ed. 1953).
3. Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir. 1921);
President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21

N.Y.S. 2d 232 (1940).
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will are administered on different terms than those placed in the trust during the settlor's lifetime.:
It is well-established in all Anglo-American jurisdictions that a disposition by will may be by reference to a fact or act having independent significance apart from its effect upon the testamentary disposition, even
though such fact or act is to occur after the execution of the will.5 For
example, a bequest of "such furniture as I may purchase to such person
as I may marry" is valid even though it involves acts of the testator, done
after the execution of the will, in selecting furniture and a wife, because
these selections have independent significance apart from their effect upon
the testamentary disposition. Professor Scott has long taken the position
that an inter vivos trust, as amended after the date of execution of a will,
is such a fact having independent significance.6 If so, it should be possible
to make a bequest to the trustee of an amendable inter vivos trust, to be
held upon the terms of the trust as they may be at the time of the testator's
death. This position has been adopted by the Restatement of Trusts, Second,
and has some judicial support.7
The second serious problem is whether a pour-over provision creates
a new testamentary trust or merely adds to an existing inter vivos trust.
A rigorously logical application of the incorporation by reference theory
might result in a pour-over provision being deemed to create a testamentary
trust separate and distinct from the inter vivos trust, the terms of which
have been incorporated by reference. In almost every case, however, the
creation of two trusts instead of one would be contrary to the intent of
the settlor and would complicate and increase the expense of administration. In a state where testamentary trusts are subject to close supervision
by probate courts but inter vivos trusts are not, confusion would result.
Thus some courts have gone to considerable lengths to carry out the settlor's
intent that there should be only one trust and that inter vivos.1
Because of the conflicting decisions regarding the validity and effect of
a pour-over provision into an amendable inter vivos trust and the doubt
4. Old Colony Trust Co., v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935);
Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934).
5. ATKINSON, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 81.
6. 1 ScoTr, TRUSTS 299 (1939); 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 54, comment i (1959); Second BankState St. Trust Co. v. Pinion, 170 N.E.2d 350 (Mass. 1960), 59 MIcH. L. REv.

1276 (1961).
8. In re York's Estate, 95 N.H. 435, 65 A. 2d 282 (1949); 1 ScoTr, TRUsTs
§ 54.3, at 382-84 (2d ed. 1956).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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as to whether the assets passing by will merely add to the inter vivos trust
or constitute a separate testamentary trust, the literature tends to suggest
the necessity of pour-over trust legislation, and a number of states have
adopted statutes on the subject." The Uniform Testamentary Additions to

Trusts Act,10 for example, permits a pour-over into'an amendable inter vivos
trust, on the terms of that trust as amended before or after the testator's
death, and provides that, unless a contrary intent is manifested, the result
will be a single inter vivos trust.
A 1956 Missouri decision raised doubt as to whether it was possible to
make a testamentary addition to an inter vivos trust without creating a
separate testamentary trust.1 The Blue case 2 makes it clear that this
can be done. As both pour-overs involved in the Blue case were to an irrevocable and unamendable inter vivos trust, it is not a decision as to
the validity and effect of a testamentary addition to an amendable inter
vivos trust, but the theory followed in the opinion indicates that the effect
of the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act may be achieved in

Missouri by judicial decision, without the necessity of resort to legislation.
MARITAL RIGHTS
Wilson v. Wilson;3 is of some interest on the question of ante-nuptial

contracts. A physician worth some $150,000, with annual earnings of about

$14,000, demanded that his seventh wife sign a contract by which her
interest in his property was limited to one third in the event the marriage
was terminated by death and to $5,000 in the event of termination by other
means. Both parties testified that the husband suddenly pulled the contract
9. FIRST REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, STATE OF NEW YORK 26 (1962);
Hobson, Testamentary Additions to Inter Vivos Trusts-The Present State of the
Law in Ohio, 30 CLEV. B. A. J. 99, 115 (1959); Palmer, Testamentary Dispositions
to the Trustee of an Inter Vivos Trust, 50 MIcH. L. REV. 33 (1951); Polasky,
'Pour-Over' Wills and the Statutory Blessing, 1959 PROCEEDINGS, SECTION OF REAL
PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW,

A.B.A., Part I, 45, 98

TRusTs

& ESTATES 949

(1959); Trachtman, Pour Overs, 97 TRusTs & ESTATES 416 (1958); Comment, 57
MICH. L. REv. 81 (1958); Note, 41 BOSTON U. L. REv. 520 (1961); Note, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 135 (1959); Note, 44 MINN. L. REv. 131 (1959); Note, 34 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1106 (1959).
10. 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 86 (Supp. 1961). This was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar
Association in 1960. It has been enacted in several states.
11. State v. Strother, 289 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1956) (en banc), 22 Mo. L. REv.
403 (1957).
12. Swpra note 1.
13. 354 S.W.2d 532 (Spr. Ct. App. 1962).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss4/6
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out of the glove compartment of his automobile and requested the wife's
signature, without giving her information as to his assets or the terms
of or need for the contract. The husband testified that this occurred a
night or two before the marriage. The wife testified that it occurred immediately after the marriage ceremony while the wedding guests were
standing by the car. A judgment incident to granting the wife a divorce,
iefusing to enforce the contract on the ground of duress, was affirmed on
the grounds that the contract was not entered into freely, fairly, knowingly,
understandingly and in good faith and that the husband unfairly failed to
disclose the extent of his property.1 4
INTESTATE SUCCESSION

In re Smviths Estate'r,involved a bachelor's will which devised his entire estate to his sister of the whole blood and expressed the wish that his
half-sister should not take any part or share. The sister of the whole blood
predeceased the testator without surviving descendants. At his death the
testator's relatives were his half-sister, her descendants, and several cousins.
The probate court determined that the cousins were entitled to the estate.
The circuit court determined that the half-sister was entitled to the estate
as sole heir on intestacy despite the language of the will disinheriting her,
and the supreme court affirmed. The opinion cites a number of Missouri
cases following the English and majority American 8 view that intestate
succession cannot be prevented by will unless the will effectively disposes of
the property to someone other than the heir. In this case the attempted
disposition to the sister of the whole blood was ineffective by reason of
lapse.
WILL CONTESTS

Ebling v. Hardesty1' was an appeal in a contest, instituted in the circuit court by the heirs on the grounds of incapacity, coercion and undue
14. There is authority for these requirements. See, e.g., Jones v. McGonigle,
327 Mo. 457, 37 S.W.2d 892 (1931). See generally ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 31. The contract involved in the Wilson case was signed in 1949, before the enactment of § 474.220, RSMo 1959, which requires full disclosure and fair consideration for a waiver of the right to elect to take against a spouse's will. Cf. §
474.120, RSMo 1959, reenacting the substance of § 469.160, RSMo 1949.
15. 353 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1962).
16. Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves. Jr. 492, 30 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1797); Note, 38
MICH. L. REv. 575 (1940).
17. 354 S.W.2d 348 (St. L. Ct. App. 1962).
Another case of some interest in this area, Carlson v. First Nat'l Bank of
Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. 1962), involved questions of admissibility of
evidence in a will contest.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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influence, of a will which disinherited the testator's heirs by devising his
estate to proponents. Proponents' motions to dismiss and strike the petition, supported by evidence that testator had executed five previous wills
disinheriting his heirs, were granted by the circuit court. The court of appeals reversed on the ground, inter alia, that the circuit court could not
sustain the motions without a determination that one or more of the
prior wills was valid, a question within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the probate court. The result reached is consistent with the generally accepted view that an heir at law has standing to contest a will disinheriting
him even though an earlier unprobated will also disinherited him, unless he
admits the validity of the earlier will.2B
McGrail v. Schinimtt1 was a second appeal in a contest of a will which
gave $500 to the testator's only child, a daughter, and the residue of his
substantial estate to his sisters. In the first appeal a judgment for the
contestant was reversed on the ground that the evidence of an insane delusion that the contestant was not the testator's daughter was insufficient
for submission to a jury.20 In the second trial additional evidence was introduced, tending to show brain impairment from long-continued alcoholism,
peculiar conduct, and severe mental confusion. In the second appeal another judgment for the contestant was affirmed in a per curiam opinion
which states that the evidence of delusion and general mental incapacity,
coupled with the unfairness of the will, was sufficient to support the verdict.
CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS

Crist v. Nesbit2 was a circuit court proceeding to construe a will.
The will, which was executed in the morning, devised to the testator's wife
"such part of my estate as under the laws of the State of Missouri my said
wife would be entitled, and no more,' '22 bequeathed one dollar to his
son, and devised the residue to the wife's sister and her husband. That
afternoon the testator entered into a property settlement with his wife,
who was about to sue him for divorce. He died the next morning. The will
was admitted to probate without contest and the widow did not elect to
18.

19.
20.
(1960),
21.

op. cit. supra note 2, § 99.
357 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1962).
McGrail v. Rhoades, 323 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1959), 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 478
25 Mo. "L.REv. 426 (1960).
352 S.W.2d 53 (Spr. Ct. App. 1961).
ATKINSON,

22. Id. at 55.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss4/6
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take against it. There was extrinsic evidence that the testator did not want
his wife to take anything under the will. The residuary devisees contended
that the will devised to the wife only so much as she would be entitled to
upon election to take against the will, which would be a third of the estate
after deduction of exempt property and family allowance. 3 They also contended that the wife was estopped by the property settlement to take
anything under the will. Both contentions were rejected and a judgment
giving the widow the full share which she would have taken on intestacy,2
that is, exempt property, family allowance and half the balance, was affirmed
by an opinion stating that there was "no ambiguity whatever" in the will.25
Whatever one's view as to the result reached, this statement scarcely seems
justified in view of the probability that the testator did not intend to devise
to his wife more than she would be entitled to receive upon election to
take against the will.
Jolhnson v. Woodard-8 was a suit for partition of land devised to the
plaintiff and the two defendants "to share equally, and to the survivor of
them." The circuit court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the
ground that, by statute,27 compulsory partition may not be had contrary
to the intention expressed in a will under which the parties claim. The
plaintiff appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which transferred the
case to the supreme court on the ground that the case involved title to
real estate. 28 The supreme court retransferred the case to the court of appeals,
holding that title to real estate in the constitutional sense was not involved
because, it being conceded that the interests of the parties in the land were
equal, the only question was one of construction of the will to determine
whether it forbade partition. Upon retransfer, the plaintiff contended that
the parties took under the will as tenants in common in fee simple because
of the statutory provision that a devise to two or more persons creates a
tenancy in common unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy.29 The
court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the will created a joint

23. §§ 474.160, .250, .260, RSMo 1959.
24. § 474.010, .250, .260, RSMo 1959.
25. Supra note 21, at 56.
26. 352 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1961).
27. § 528.130, RSMo 1959.
28. Johnson v. Woodard, 343 S.W.2d 646 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
29. § 442.450, RSMo 1959. This section excepts devises to executors, trustees
and husband and wife.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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tenancy for lives with contingent remainder in fee to the survivor and
forbade compulsory partition.80
ADMINISTRATIoN

oF ESTATES

When a person has been missing and not heard from for more than
seven years it is possible to commence ordinary proceedings for the administration of his estate, relying upon the common law presumption of
death. 81 Because the fact of death is jurisdictional in such proceedings, they
are void if the missing person is alive. 2 Missouri, like many other states,
has legislation authorizing a special type of proceeding for the administration of estates of missing persons.38 Under this legislation, the proceedings
are not void if the missing person is not dead but the distributees take
subject to the right of the missing person to recover the property distributed
to them or its value. 3- Replogle v. Replogle35 involved land which belonged
to a man who died in 1937, survived by two sons who were his sole heirs.
In 1938 a missing person administration proceeding was conducted as to
the estate of one of the sons, who had been missing for more than seven
years, and his assets were distributed to the other son, who retained possession of all the father's land. More than twenty years later the missing
brother reappeared and sued for partition of the land. The court, mentioning the fact that, prior to 1956, orders of distribution did not include
land, held that the missing person administration proceeding did not prevent a defense of adverse possession. As orders of distribution issued under
the Missouri Probate Code of 1955 do include land8 the same result might
not be reached in the case of a missing person administration proceeding
commenced since its enactment.
Yonke v. Alber's Estate37 involved a claim against an estate for a $10,000
30. Johnson v. Woodard, supra note 28, relying upon Hunter v. Hunter, 320
S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1959) (criticized, Eckhardt, Property Law in Missouri, 24 Mo. L.
REv. 456 (1959)), and distinguishing McClendon v. Johnson, 337 S.W.2d 77 (Mo.
1960), on the ground that the latter case involved construction of a deed rather

than a will.
31. § 490.620, RSMo 1959, originally enacted as c. 62, § 44, RSMo 1855,
codifies and extends part of the common law rule by creating a presumption that a
resident of Missouri who has been absent from the state for seven years is dead.
32. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1894).

33. §§ 473.697-.720, RSMo 1959, originally enacted as Mo. Laws 1909, at 99.
34. § 473.713, RSMo 1959.

35. 350 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. 1961).
36. § 473.617, RSMo 1959.
37. 351 S.W.2d 794 (K.C. Ct. App. 1961).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss4/6
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attorney fee for procuring a divorce for the decedent in Kansas. During
the pendency of the divorce proceeding the parties thereto entered into a
property settlement, one clause of which provided that a farm should be
conveyed to a trustee who was to sell it and apply the proceeds to the
payment of a $10,000 attorney fee to each party's lawyer, any surplus to
be paid to the husband. The land was so conveyed. Subsequently the Kansas
court disapproved the mentioned clause of the property settlement but
entered a default decree of divorce against the husband, approving the
other clauses of the settlement. The wife's will was admitted to probate in
Kansas and her lawyer in the divorce case filed a claim for a $10,000 fee
in the administration proceeding for her Missouri assets, describing his security under the Kansas trust. Judgment on a directed verdict for the
claimant for the full amount of his claim was affirmed. It was held that,
under the governing provision of the Missouri Probate Code,88 a secured
claimant is entitled to the same amount as if his claim were unsecured
and that the claimant was entitled to a directed verdict for the full amount
despite the fact that his claim rested upon an oral contract of retainer,
because the disapproved clause of the property settlement amounted to an
agreement as to the amount due.
Ballard's Estate v. Clay County"0 involved the effect of a decision
rendered last year,40 that probate courts have no jurisdiction to give equitable relief under the statutes authorizing proceedings to discover assets
wrongfully withheld from or by an executor or administrator.41 The decedent paid the county $10,000 in consideration of its agreement to allow
him to live in the county home as long as he chose to do so. He resided in
the county home until his death, a period of some three and a half years.
His administratrix instituted a discovery proceeding against the county
to recover so much of the $10,000 as was not expended by the county for
his care. A judgment for the county was reversed, the court holding that
the contract, being beyond the powers of the county, was wholly void and
that resort to equity was unnecessary in order to secure restitution of the
money paid. It was also held that a provision of the discovery statutes that
"if the party cited does not admit the allegations in the affidavit, he shall
38.
39.
40.
(1962).
41.

§ 473.387, RSMo 1959.
355 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. 1962).
In re Frech's Estate, 347 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. 1961), 27 Mo. L. REv. 111
§§ 473.340-.357, RSMo 1959.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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be examined under oath" 42 does not impose a jurisdictional requirement that the defendant in the proceeding be examined under oath. Consequently, the administratrix could waive such examination.
Cable v. WilkinS413 was an interpleader suit brought by an administra'tor in the circuit court to determine whether a son of the decedent or the
son's security assignee was entitled to distribution of the son's share in
the estate. A judgment for the assignee was affirmed without mention of
the question of whether the issue should have been litigated in the probate
,court instead of the circuit court.
The plaintiff in Stark v. Moffit" bailed a number of hogs. The bailee
,died and his executrix sold the hogs and placed the proceeds in escrow
vith a bank to await determination of adverse claims to the hogs. The
plaintiff filed a claim for the value of the hogs in the probate court against
the estate of the bailee. The plaintiff later commenced a suit in the circuit
'court against the executrix and the escrow agent to impose a constructive
trust upon the fund in escrow, alleging that the bailee's estate was insolvent.
This suit was dismissed on the ground that the circuit court could not take
jurisdiction while a claim based on the same cause of action was pending
in the probate court. The judgment of dismissal was reversed on the ground
that the probate court, lacking general equity jurisdiction, could not impose
a constructive trust on the fund in escrow, the relief sought in the circuit
'court suit.
As originally enacted in 1955 the nonclaim statute provided that
actions revived or commenced against the estate of a deceased person
should be barred unless notice of their revival or institution was filed in the
probate court within nine months after the first published notice of letters .4
The statute was amended in 1959 to provide that, unless notice of the revival or institution of such an action is filed in the probate court within
the nine month period, no recovery may be had on any judgment therein
out of assets administered in the probate court. 46 Even after this amendment,
the supreme court held that, as to cases governed by the original statute,
the personal representative could not waive or be estopped to assert the
bar of the statute, and that it prevented entry of a judgment in the barred
42. § 473.343, RSMo 1959.

43. 352 S.W.2d 50 (Spr. Ct. App. 1961).
44. 352 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
45. § 473.360(2), RSMo 1957 Supp.
46. § 473.360(2), RSMo 1959.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss4/6
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action even though the sole purpose of the action was to collect from the
decedents liability insurer rather than from probate assets.47 In Rabin s.
Krogsdal s a personal injury action was pending against her when the
decedent died on January 6, 1959. The plaintiff revived the action against
her executor but did not file notice of revival in the probate court. It was
held that, although the 1959 amendment did not become effective until
August 29, 1959, more than seven months after the decedent's death, it
governed the case. Accordingly, the plaintiff could proceed to judgment in
the personal injury action although he could not collect it from probate
assets. In Darrak v. Foster'5 the same result was reached as to a proceeding commenced against an administrator in February, 1959. In the latter
case the decedent died December 9, 1958, and the first published notice of
letters was on January 16, 1959.
Nebraska Hardware Mat. Ins. Co. v,. BrowiO° was another in the
series of cases applying a rigidly literal interpretation to the nonclaim provisions of the Missouri Probate Code. 51 One section of the code bars claims
which are not filed in the probate court within nine months after the
first published notice of letters testamentary or of administration. 52 Another provides that an action commenced against an executor or administrator is considered a claim duly filed from the time of serving the original
process on the executor or administrator and the filing of a written notice
in the probate court of the institution of the action.5 3 In the instant case
the action against the administrator was commenced in the circuit court
and a copy of the petition filed in the probate court within nine months
after the first published notice of letters. It was impossible to serve the
administrator until nine days after the expiration of the nine-month period
because he was out of the state from a time before the commencement
47. Smith v. Maynard, 339 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. 1960) (en banc); Clarke v.
Organ, 329 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1959) (en banc), 25 Mo. L. REv. 432 (1960). Judge
Storckman dissented in both cases, and Chief Justice Hyde joined him in the
Srmithr case, pointing out that an administrator may now be appointed for the
sole purpose of being sued in a wrongful death or personal injury action although
the decedent has no assets whatever.
48. 346 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1961), 27 Mo. L. REv. 111 (1962).
49. 355 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. 1962).
50. 355 S.W.2d 395 (K.C. Ct. App. 1962).

51. For other cases in this series see 25 Mo. L. Rav. 432 (1960), 27 Mo. L.

REv. 111 (1962).
52. § 473.360, RSMo 1959.

53. § 473.367, RSMo 1959. Prior to its amendment in 1959 this section required the filing of a copy of the process and return of service in the probate court.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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of the action until eight days after the expiration of the nine months. A
judgment dismissing the action was affirmed. The palpable injustice of
the result reached is apparent. Under this interpretation of the statute an
executor or administrator can effectively prevent the institution of any
action or suit against the estate by merely absconding or concealing himself.
The litigation involved in State ex rel McCubbin v. McMiliiaiz°l arose
out of a 1953 automobile collision in which a Texan driving one of the
vehicles was killed and a passenger in the other vehicle was injured. The
injured passenger, suing on the theory that the two drivers were joint tortfeasors, recovered a judgment for $35,000 against the surviving driver and
the Missouri administrator of the deceased Texan. He then commenced a
suit in equity against the judgment defendants, the Missouri insurer of the
surviving driver and the Texas insurer of the deceased driver. The plaintiff
dismissed this suit as to the Texas insurer in consideration of $10,000,
and recovered $25,000 from the Missouri insurer of the surviving driver.
The latter filed a cross-claim for contribution against the administrator
and the Texas insurer, which sought prohibition of proceedings on the
cross-claim on the ground, inter alia, that it was barred by the nonclaim
provisions of the Missouri Probate Code.55 It was held that the nonclaim
statutes did not affect the Missouri insurer's claim for contribution against
the Texas insurer.
In State ex rel. Reis v. Nangle'8 a probate court removed an administrator and appointed an administrator de bonis non. The exceptions of the
administrator de bonis non to the settlements of the former administrator
were referred to a commissioner for hearing. Both the former administrator
and the administrator de bonis non filed exceptions to the commissioner's
report but only the former administrator and his surety appealed from the
probate court order entered pursuant to the report. On appeal the circuit
court granted a motion to limit testimony in the trial de novo to matters
raised by the appellant former administrator's exceptions to the commissioner's report. The court of appeals, holding that, on an appeal from a probate
court order, all issues adjudicated by the order are opened to readjudication,
granted mandamus to compel the circuit judge to hear testimony as to
54. 349 S.W.2d 453 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
. 55. § 464.020, RSMo 1949, superseded on January 1, 1956, by what is now
§ 473.360, RSMo 1959.
56. 349 S.W.2d 508 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
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matters raised by the administrator de bonis non's exceptions to the commissioner's report, although he had not appealed from the probate court
order.
CREATION OF TRUSTS

Duncan v. Academy of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart57 was a suit by-

the heirs of the grantors in an 1854 deed by which the grantors, in consideration of $630, conveyed some three acres of land to Ann Shannon with
the following proviso:
Provided however and these presents are upon this express
condition that she the said Ann Shannon shall hold said land for
the sole use and benefit of the order of the sisters of the Sacred
Heart of the City of St. Joseph in the County and State aforesaid
and for no other use or purpose whatever.
Ann Shannon and others later incorporated the defendant academy,
which acquired title from her. Plaintiffs, alleging that the defendant was:
about to sell or lease the land to another order of nuns so that it could
move its academy elsewhere, sought relief on three different theories: (1>
that the 1854 deed was a conveyance on special limitation which left a
possibility of reverter in the grantors, so that the title automatically reverted when the land ceased to be used as an academy; (2) that the proviso
was a condition subsequent under which the grantors retained a right of
entry upon breach; and (3) that the proviso imposed an equitable use restriction. The court affirmed a judgment for the defendants in an opinion
which rejected the first two theories as a matter of construction." Assuming,
without deciding, that the proviso imposed an equitable use restriction, the,
court ruled that the plaintiffs could not enforce it because they did not assert ownership of other land to which the restriction was appurtenant and
because of the lapse of time and inequity of enforcement. The court could
have reached the same result with less difficulty by construing the proviso,
as merely requiring Ann Shannon to hold in trust for the sisterhood.
TRUST ADMINISTRATION

Sebree v. Rosen" involved a number of trust administration questions.
57. 350 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. 1961).
58. As to them, see SIMES & SMrrH, LAW OF FuTuR

INTERESTS §§ 247, 248,
286 (2d ed. 1956); Fratcher, Defeasarwe as a Restrictive Device in Michigan, 52:

MicH. L. REv. 505 (1954).

59. 349 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1961).
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An instrument creating an inter vivos trust of real estate worth about a
million dollars empowered the trustee to invest and reinvest the principal
and to pay himself five per cent of income as his fee. One of the properties
having been condemned, the trustee used the proceeds to purchase a hotel
from a partnership of which his brother-in-law was a member. The hotel
was subject to three (leeds of trust, one of which secured a note given by
the trustee's mother-in-law. Another of the trustees brothers-in-law received a real estate commission from the vendors for effecting the sale.
After the purchase, the trustee employed this brother-in-law to manage the
hotel, paying him five per cent of gross rentals for his services and taking
an additional five per cent of gross rentals as his trustee's fee. It was held
that the purchase of the hotel as a trust investment was not in itself improper but that the trustee acted improperly in operating it directly and
in treating the gross rentals as income for the purpose of computing his
fee. The decision is in accord with the great weight of authority in holding
that a trustee may not operate an active business without express authorization in the terms of the trust.60 It seems unfortunate, however, that the

opinion fails to discuss the difficult question of whether the purchase of a
trust investment, when close relatives of the trustee are financially interested in the transaction, is a breach of the trustee's duty of loyalty.61
Co. 6 2

raised an interesting problem of
election of remedies for breach of trust. The defendant trust company held
all the stock of a national bank. It transferred the bank stock to trustees
for the benefit of holders of certificates of beneficial interest to be issued to
the stockholders of the trust company. The trust instrument gave the
trust company an option to repurchase the bank stock at book value. Seventeen years later the trust company exercised the option. Two certificate
holders then instituted a class suit to compel the calculation of book value
at a higher figure than that computed by the trust company and the
trustees. This suit was successful and the certificate holders were paid the
book value computed at a higher figure. 63 While the first suit was pending,
Berger v. Mercantile Trust

§ 571 (2d ed. 1960); RESTATEMENT (SEccomment m (1959); Adelman, The Power
to Carry on the Business of a Decedent, 36 MicH. L. Ruv. 185 (1937).
61. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 170, comments h, g (1959); Scott,
The Trwstees Duty of Loyalty, 49 HLv. L. REv. 521 (1936).
62. 352 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1961).
60. BOGERT, TRusTs AND TRusTEEs
oND), TRUSTS § 227, comment f, § 230,

63. Moser v. Keller, 303 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. 1957).
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two certificate holders, one of whom was a named plaintiff in the first suit,
instituted another suit for a determination that the option was void because, under both federal and state law, the trust company was ineligible
to purchase the bank stock. It was held that by proceeding to judgment in
the first suit to enforce the option, the individual plaintiffs in the first suit
and all members of the class for which they sued were precluded, by the
doctrine of election of remedies, from proceeding with another suit to declare
the option void."'
CONSTRUcTIVE TRUSTS

Cokn v. Jefferson Sav. & Loan Ass'n.6 5 involved a somewhat complicated
series of transactions relating to some 84 acres of land. The plaintiff, who
had developed a subdivision in the vicinity, discovered that one Buckel
had a contract, dated August 29, 1958, for purchase of the tract in question for $540,000 cash on October 1, 1958, which contract was not assignable
without the consent of the vendor, but which Buckel was willing to assign
for $12,500. On September 24 the plaintiff informed the defendant of these
facts and proposed that the plaintiff purchase the tract with $100,000 of
his own money, the other funds needed to be lent to plaintiff by the
defendant. Buckel was then brought into the conversation, and executed
an assignment of his contract to the defendant in consideration of $12,500,
paid by the defendant. Buckel undertook to secure from the vendor a consent to the assignment and an extension of the closing date. On October 3
plaintiff and defendant met with the vendors' agents and learned that,
Buckel's August 29 check for earnest money having been returned for insufficient funds, the vendors had rescinded his contract as of September 23.

An understanding was reached at this meeting that the vendors would sell
to the defendant for $540,000. A contract between the vendor and defendant was executed on October 10 and the sale was later closed. Thereafter
the plaintiff sued to compel the defendant to hold the land on constructive
trust for him, alleging that it had acquired title thereto incident to a con-

fidential relationship in the nature of an agency. A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground that plaintiff and defendant were dealing
at arm's length, and that the most plaintiff established was an unenforceable
oral promise to purchase land and convey it to him.
64. Citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
language to this effect.
65. 349 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. 1961).

TRUSTS

§ 218 (1959), which contains
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In Townsley v. Thielecke-6 the plaintiffs were in default on two deeds
of trust. When the creditor secured by the second deed of trust mentioned
foreclosure, they quit-claimed the property to his mother in consideration
of $20. Nearly two years later, after the second deed of trust had been foreclosed and the title conveyed through a straw party to the creditor's mother,
the plaintiffs sued to impose a constructive trust on the property in the
hands of the grantee on the theory that her son had promised to refund any
surplus obtained from the property over the amounts due on the deeds of
trust. A decree denying relief on the ground of inadequate proof of the alleged promise was affirmed.
Hall v. Smith,8" was a suit to establish a constructive trust. In 1958 the
attorney for one of the four co-tenants of a hundred-acre tract of land commenced a partition suit against the other three co-tenants. The land was
sold at partition sale to Smith, for $1,000. The sale was approved by the
court, the attorney for the plaintiff in the partition suit received a $100 fee,
and the balance of the sale price was paid to the parties, who receipted therefor. More than two years later the parties to the partition suit commenced
the present proceeding against Smith, alleging that he was the son and office
manager of the attorney for the plaintiff in the partition suit, that he directed the sheriff in the conduct of the partition sale, discouraged other purchasers from bidding at the sale, shared in the attorney's fee, and "on or
about the date the said sale was approved by the court, . . informed these
plaintiffs that he had purchased the land for their benefit and protection."6B8
The petition also alleged that the price at the partition sale was grossly inadequate and offered to repay the $1,000. The trial court granted a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the petition failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Judgment of dismissal was affirmed on the ground
that the judgment in the partition suit was res judicata of the issues raised.

66. 349 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. 1961).
67. 355 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1962).
68. Id. at 54.
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